The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has revealed seven major loopholes confirming the continuing Iran’s violations over the nuclear program.
The US Institute of Science and International Security confirmed that:
The final findings of the report recently handed over by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), continue to violate the production of low-enriched uranium in the nuclear deal.
The report highlighted seven major loopholes in flagrant Iranian violations and analytically refuted the excesses of the mullahs’ regime during the past period in which Tehran subjected to US sanctions.
7 loopholes expose Iran’s violations
- Verification and monitoring
- Low – enriched uranium
- Deployment of centrifuges
- Fordou Fuel Enrichment Station
- Production of heavy water and conversion of Arak reactor
- Advanced Centrifuge
- Illegal purchases
Verification and monitoring
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issues its usual statements on verifying that declared nuclear material did not divert in Iran. But continues its
- “assessments regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.”
The latter states that the IAEA has not yet determined that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful.
The IAEA finally visited the depot in early 2019 and took environmental samples and discovered radioactive materials and potential uranium.
Low – enriched uranium
Iran continued to exceed the ceiling of the Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement, which amounts to
- 300 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (hexafluoride mass)
- 202.8 kilograms (uranium mass)
Excess enrichment occurs at the Natanz enrichment plant.
Deployment of centrifuges
- At the Natanz fuel enrichment plant, the IAEA reported that Iran withdrew 18 IR-1 centrifuges during the reporting period.
- 52 IR-1 centrifuges withdrawn, most of which probably installed because of the expansion of enrichment activities.
- In February 2019, no IR-1 centrifuges withdrawn.
Fordou Fuel Enrichment Station
The IAEA omits any change in Iran’s activities in Fordow or with the stable isotope separation project implemented there with Russia’s help.
- 10 IR-1 centrifuges installed in a design of 16 IR-1 centrifuge sites.
- IR-1 centrifuge installed in one location.
“For the purpose of conducting initial research and research and development activities related to stable isotope production”.
Production of heavy water and conversion of Arak reactor
Iran remains under the Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement limit of:
- 130 metric tons on its heavy water stockpile
- 125.5 metric tons
- under IAEA control
Where Iran used 2.2 metric tons of heavy water for Research and development related to the production of spilled compounds for medica.
Iran deployed and tested with uranium an additional IR-6 centrifuge, bringing the number it tested from 10 to 11, and Iran installed 33 IR-6, which appears to be a flagrant violation, meaning that the number of centrifuges Published should correspond to the number tested, not exceeding this value by a factor of three, where the numerical limits on Iran’s enrichment plan are long-term. The IAEA said technical discussions on the issue were continuing.
Eventually, The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that it has attended no meetings of the Joint Working Group of the UN Comprehensive Nuclear Convention Committee. Iran has purchased controlled goods in the dual-use lists of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Gained Missile Network.